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ABSTRACT
The current Australian human services charity profile is as a socially moral, not-for-profit
business which generates a surplus; a community organization advocating on behalf of
disadvantaged people and communities. This description is becoming harder to reconcile with
the reality of relativist values-based care work carried out on a daily basis by tens of thousands
of women for meagre wages in poor employment conditions. This paper argues that human
services charity work is gendered and combined with its religious, social and ethical
underpinnings, oppressive employment conditions and practices are facilitated that are
flourishing in the present economic rationalist/neoliberal environment.
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THE ECONOMICS OF CHARITY – WHO CARES?
INTRODUCTION
The ‘economics of charity’ explores the charitable business paradigm from a feminist
perspective, discussing the financial viability of the sizeable Australian charitable human
services industry contained within the Third Sector which is based on cheap female labour in
care work. The profile of this particular group of Australian charities is predominantly as a
socially moral, not-for-profit business generating a surplus; community organisations that
advocate on behalf of disadvantaged people and communities. It is argued that the neoliberal
business, economic rationalist approach has to be applied to charities to ensure the survival of
essential community services. Such survival has a heavy price tag. In particular, this description
has become harder to reconcile with the reality of relativist values-based care work carried out
on a daily basis by the tens of thousands of women who labour for meagre wages in poor
employment conditions. If charities want to be different from both business and government in
the key identifying organisational characteristics, such as their leadership practices, espoused
ethics and values, integrated spiritual behaviours and end the unspoken gender discrimination,
the predominant economic, corporate business approach has to be re-evaluated and changed to
ensure a different future that eliminates such discrimination. Therefore, this paper argues that
human services charities should not be assessed solely from the neo-liberal economic rationalist
business paradigm. This paper provides a feminist critique of such considerations which has
implications for the ethics of caring expressed by women in charities.

In 2005, the Business Review Weekly (BRW) described the Australian charitable sector as being
‘worth $70 billion and [..] almost 10% of the economy, employing more than 600,000 people’:

3

Charities, clubs and non-government organisations affect everyone.

The

Government is outsourcing more and more services to the sector […] religious
groups are the hidden giants of the economy (Ferguson 2005:45).
Turnover in Australia’s non-profit sector in 1995-96 was $27 billion (Lyons and
Hocking 2000); in 1999-2000 it was $35 billion (Lyons, Salamon & Sokolowski
2007); last financial year is was probably $50 billion (Lyons 2007:12).
While the business paradigm appears to be all-pervasive and accepted unquestioningly in the
human services charitable sector, a different perspective is explored because the question ‘who
cares’ in connection with charities, evokes strong emotions with the value-laden expectations of
their work. This Paper focuses on the providers of ‘care’; it offer insights into the broader
national discourse about gender discrimination, the social and cultural isolation of women and
the gendered economics of charities for those involved in the work. For this discussion, the word
‘charity’ is restricted to human service organisations that provide community services for public
benefit, which are not-for-profit, non-government and advocate on behalf of disadvantaged
people and communities. Lyons’ (2007) argues this definition is too narrow, located as these
charities are within the Third Sector, because it influences the perspective of this broader Sector
within which they are situated. For Lyons, the Third Sector includes all organisations that pass
the ‘test of membership, that is, private organisations that are non-profit-distributing and/or
democratically governed’ (Lyons 2007:10). Nonetheless, this narrower definition provides the
parameters for this article.
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BACKGROUND: THE GENDERED PROFILE OF THE AUSTRALIAN CHARITY
The charitable sector’s workers comprise 87% women (ACOSS 2005). ‘Care work is
overwhelmingly undertaken by women’ (Meagher and Healey 2005:27) and the reality is that
care work in all its various guises and situations for centuries has been primarily women’s work.
This practice is active in today’s societies and still has significant currency (Meagher and Healey
2005:9; Morris 2007:87). However, definitions of care work continue to evolve, as is borne out
by recent research for the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Daly and Standing 2001) and
the European Union (EU) (‘What is care work?’ [no date]), both of which have provided several
defining characteristics for care work. These characteristics focus on the work itself and its
implications and experience, not recognising that it is women who do the work, irrespective of
its description. I argue that this is a key element in the definition of care work. These defining
characteristics include paid and unpaid work and contain elements, notions and experiences of
volunteerism that adhere to care work activities and motivations inherent in the issues of
gendered discrimination, spirituality and ethics. The quality of care is integrated into the
motivations for care provision, together with relationships consequently created between the
carer and those for whom they care. This gendered profile of Australian charities underpins the
four elements of my proposition, that the: i) employment opportunities for women in charities, ii)
the ethical dimensions of women’s care work, iii) the Christian antecedents of female caring and
its spiritualisation, and iv) the female character of charities, all point to gendered charity work as
a site of gendered disadvantage.
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1.

AUSTRALIAN CHARITABLE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN

Employment opportunities for women in the charitable care sector are significant, but their pay
and working conditions are poor. Women are far more likely to be employed part-time and on a
casual basis, ‘limiting their capacity to achieve adequate wages and career development
opportunities’ (Meagher and Healey 2005). Gender discrimination is evident in care worker
incomes at all qualifications levels; and in community services, care workers achieve
substantially lower hourly rates of income than non-care workers (Meagher 2007). Importantly,
‘social policy workers should be concerned if delivering services to vulnerable citizens such as
children, the aged and people with disabilities creates another vulnerable social group: the
workers employed to care for them’ (Meagher 2007:152).

In addition, service recipients

themselves are in danger of being harmed by the low wages and poor conditions of the workers.
The labour intensive nature of care work consists almost entirely of the service interaction
between the care workers and service users. Their skills, qualifications and capacity are directly
affected by low pay and poor working conditions. These do not provide sufficient incentive to
increase the quality of the services through better trained employees, professional growth and
education, as this adds unacceptable costs to the labour. The evidence points to a ‘care penalty’
(Meagher 2007:163) in the labour market which is seen as a consequence of the cultural
devaluation and poor industrial protection of care work. This is at odds with the value placed on
the ideal of ‘care’, the sacralisation of the caring motivations. However, this aspect of care work
as it intersects with the gendered economy continues to be ignored and is not translated into any
value subsequently placed on care work.
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The debate about this issue is insistent. There is a perception the payment of living wages will
change the quality of the caring relationship, thereby diminishing it, changing people’s
motivations from the ethics of care to one driven by money. This is criticized strongly by
feminist economists, who highlighted this systemic construct that also contains the benefits that
arise from not changing the current conditions and thinking (Meagher 2007). It is still a
significant belief among care workers, although there is some evidence it is slowly changing in
some Australian states, for example, Western Australia (Morris 2007). This concern is a
contributing factor in continuing to hold wages at low levels and it supports the proposition that
economic citizenship is gendered and particularly so within the welfare state. The implications
for charitable work suggests it has been constructed around ‘two-track citizenship’ with male
citizenship defined in relation to paid work in the productive economy and female citizenship in
relation to unpaid work in the home, volunteering, care work and the valued actualisation of the
roles of wife and mother (Lund 2002). Women’s employment is linked far more strongly to
unpaid work responsibilities including care in the home. These linkages underlie the gendered
patterns in women and men’s experiences in the different labour markets (Western et al.
2007:407). There is a strong connection between women working in care industries and the lack
of value placed on their work, their position in the workplace and society as a whole (Pateman
2000).
One of the dangers of focusing on this critical aspect of the broader gender economics debate is
that the feminist issues and economic and industrial justice for the workers and social justice for
the service recipients, distracts those working in the sector. It prevents them from examining the
implications of this sacralisation of the characteristics of care work that have, until recent times,
contributed to the sense of difference held by human services charity in their work and service
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and have therefore been strongly held. Some of this narrative is held in the discourse concerning
the ethical and moral dimension of caring, it is one of the dominant myths in the human services
discourse, but not the only one.

2.

THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S CARE WORK

Secondly, care work is perceived to contain an inherent ethical dimension (Gilligan 1982). As
care work is a female gendered activity as demonstrated by the employment statistics (Meagher
and Healey 2005; 2006), it is argued that it contains this ethical dimension precisely because of
work feminisation. In a female dominated industry, the act of caring visibly displays many of
the care work characteristics which are described and are accepted as inherently female. This
relationship between the female ethics of care and charities providing care work by women being
places of gender discrimination is explored here. Research literature affirms this description of
organisational caring which reflects the tone of the female ethical caring experience.
Ethically, caring, the relation in which we do meet the other morally, will be
described as arising out of natural caring […] the relation of natural caring will be
identified as the human condition that we, consciously or unconsciously, perceive as
‘good’. It is that condition toward which we long and strive and it is our longing for
caring – to be in that special relation – that provides the motivation for us to be
moral. We want to be moral in order to remain in the caring relation (Noddings
2003:5).
This reinforces the notion of care work being situated within the relationship between the carer
and the person being cared for and the motivations for this arrangement and experience. There is
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a body of literature that explores the ethics of care as both a feminized attribute and a claimed
characteristic of being female.
Broadly speaking, feminist ethics are claimed by those who believe that there exists a normal
feminist approach to ethical problems as an alternative to the male approach. If the view is that
history and philosophy have been written by men and the worldview thus presented is of a male
world, with gender, sex, race and class specific male systems, structures and explanations, then
there is a real need to situate the female perspective within the centre of the feminist thinking to
see what differences might exist when comparisons are made across all perspectives:
Among the many reasons women have identified for developing new approaches to
ethics, perhaps the most obvious comes from the experience of being caught up short
by the anti-woman bias that pervades so much of the existing theoretical work in
ethics. Even the most cursory feminist review of the work of the leading moral
theorists reveals that the existing proposals of philosophic ethics do not constitute
the objective, impartial theories that they are claimed to be; rather, most theories
reflect and support explicitly gender-biased and often blatantly misogynist values
(Sherwin 1993:3-10).
However, it is argued that feminist ethics are not a place solely for women (Sherwin 1993). The
subordination of one group by another is morally wrong as well as being politically unjust.
There should always be a connection between the ethical theorising and policy formulation and
the context is always critical.

Those thinking about the issues should always look at the

connections between the issue in hand and the patterns of oppression, ‘especially, but not solely,
those associated with sexism’ (Sherwin 1993:22). Gilligan and Noddings have argued for their
ethic of caring and their theory’s capacity to look into relationship as the abiding reason for their
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thinking. Sherwin argued feminist ethics must recognise the moral perspective of women, and
insofar as that included the perspective described as an ethics of care, we should expand our
moral agenda accordingly.
However, we should be careful, in this consideration not to reinforce those perceived differences
within an already existing sexist culture (Wolf 1993). There are four main ways women have
been excluded from traditional philosophy (Mullet 1993): by explicit denigration, by simple
omission, by system exclusion and by the adversary method. Lawrence Kohlberg (1981), an
educational psychologist, studied 84 boys over a 20 year period and then generalised his results
claiming they represented six universal stages of moral development, an example of ‘simple
omission’.
In response, Gilligan (1982) claimed she had found two different languages, one of impartiality
and justice, and a second, relational language of care. Her work was based on Kohlberg’s
research results as it seemed from his results that women did not, on average, achieve the same
levels of moral reasoning as men. Gilligan challenged this and claimed that, rather than being
morally immature, females reasoned differently. Thus female ethical reasoning was not based on
impartial principles of justice, but on care and responsibility within personal relationships
(Trevino et al. 2003).
Gilligan’s work was seen as controversial by many, an assessment arising from her research
methodology and ideological content (Chanter 2006). Wolf believed Gilligan’s work was
influential in the growth of ‘difference feminism’, which focused on traditional feminine
qualities, nurturing, intuition, emotionality, attachment rather than autonomy, listening rather
than speaking, all of which were seen as being of less value than traditional male values of
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assertiveness, reason and blind impartiality. Difference feminism provided a way of looking at
those qualities and turned them into a separate system that was not inferior to those of men.
Importantly, however, Wolf suggested Gilligan and others may be ‘premature in assuming that
women’s interests in connections, outweighs their interest in recognition, status and
individuation’ (Wolf 1993:267). So it has been argued that Gilligan’s work left people with the
impression that an ethic of caring is better than an ethic of justice. However:
[Gilligan] insisted that she was claiming only a difference, not a superiority. Her
aim, she stressed, was to ensure that woman’s moral voice be taken as seriously as
man’s … [it] is an apples-or-oranges question. Like apples and oranges, an ethics
of care and an ethics of justice are both good. But to insist that one kind of morality
is the best is to manifest a nearly pathological need for a unitary, absolute, and
universal moral standard that can erase our very real moral tensions as with a
magic wand. If we are to achieve a moral maturity, Gilligan implied, we must be
willing to vacillate between an ethics of care and an ethics of justice (Tong
1997:260).
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, feminist thought has included a reorientation
towards an ethics of care, as propounded by Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (2003). One of the
principle features of this position is the emphasis on our caring connections with others, as
opposed to that presented by the atomistic, ‘essentially solipsistic ideal of the meditative
Cartesian thinker’ (Chanter 2006:75). Rather than imagining a world comprising rational people
who ‘know’ which connections have to be made and whose duties are outlined as universals, the
care ethic takes as its starting point our total integration and the embedded nature already in
existence in our relationships with other people. ‘The networks that constitute our relationships
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with others inform the way we think not just of others but also of ourselves. Taking seriously
our responsibility to others also contributes to the very notion of our identities’ (Chanter
2006:75). This analysis has implications for the analysis of care work and its embodiment as
female charities.
Thus a view of female ethics and morality has been proposed to consider care work and charities.
It argues that a decision was ‘right or wrong according to how faithfully it was rooted in caring,
that is, in a genuine response to the perceived needs of others’ (Noddings 2003:53). This view of
female ethics is critical for women as care workers as they assess their relationship to the
concept and acts of care work, their experience and perceptions of it as a motivator and its
capacity to enrich and grow relationships, while downplaying their economic entitlements. It has
proved very useful for charities holding onto their character and differences and ensuring their
economic survival. This position is different to the male hierarchy of ethics which excluded the
female perspective and refused women access to the different stories and experiences of ethical
behaviour as legitimate and normal. These opposing world views have ignored the experiences
of women providing care work. In addition, I believe the argument that the female ethic of care
work and women’s experiences as carers and/or recipients is a phenomenon that owes some of
its consciousness to the Christian context, solidly established over the last two millennia. It is
also due to the influence this has had on gendered female work including its classist, racist
overtones.
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3.

CHRISTIAN

ANTECEDENTS

OF

FEMALE

CARING

AND

ITS

SPIRITUALISATION
The third part of the argument acknowledges the Christian church’s centrality in its construction
of the work ethic as it is known today in Australia, and its contribution to shaping the female role
of care work and continuing the justification for its current gendered constructs. Our concept of
work as a determinant of personal value, identity and as an indicator of good character and
morals, was alien in the past (Beder 2000:9). It was after the 16th and 17th centuries Reformation
period that work and employment acquired its moral dimension and became a central defining
characteristic of human existence.

As people worked hard to serve God and prove their

worthiness to their neighbours, this belief in the inherent nature of the moral righteousness of
work created a diligent and reliable workforce which enabled the rich to grow richer. Even
today, there is a strong belief in the connection between the ‘virtue of work and wealth’ which
endorses the matching perception that the poor have only themselves to blame for their poverty
(Beder 2000; Orwell 2001; Zizek 2008). Poverty came to be seen as a sign of godlessness and
moral weakness, while idleness was evidence of personal inadequacy and laziness.

The

acquisition of wealth became a worthy goal particularly with the helpful interpretations of certain
Christian teachings. Virtue accrued to those who helped the poor. The poor were taught that
being poor was an inescapable experience set by one’s station in life into which one was born;
rewards would be given in heaven if you worked hard on earth. In the end, the propositions
supported the belief that individuals were born to a predetermined position in life. It was futile to
try and change these circumstances. Poor people were better off if they engaged in preparing for
the next life and left the preoccupation with wealth to those who already had it. This was
ordained by God and should not be challenged. The Christian church endorsed this worldview.
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In 19th century Australia, during the establishment and consolidation of social welfare practices,
the influence of religion and the churches’ role in charitable human services were significant
(Melville and McDonald 2006:74). Early charitable work contained strong moralistic, religious
narrative and language, focused on reforming the individual, saving their soul, by ensuring they
worked. It highlighted further opportunities for discrimination, differences developed between
the deserving and undeserving poor, blaming them as the ‘other’ for their situation. It is argued
that the role of religion in charitable work was ‘normalised to the point where it was taken for
granted’ (Melville and McDonald 2006:74). This was supported by the findings of the 1995
Industry Commission which noted the top six social welfare providers and nine of the top fifteen
providers were church organisations. Combine this with the numbers and gender of those
employed in care work (Meagher and Healey 2005) and the connection between the church’s
role in promoting the place of women in this work and the work itself is undeniable.

From the feminist’s historical perspective, there has been a predominant belief that it was too
hard for women to challenge the political and business systems to achieve the necessary policy
changes to restructure life circumstances for the poor, neglected and abused in society. It was
also hard for women to deliver supporting services within an increasingly competitive
environment. Women have long provided charitable care works as a respectable activity in and
out of the home as it did not disturb the cultural norm, the accepted image of women as wives,
mothers and nurturers. It enabled them to fulfil the image and expectations of female
virtuousness in the process of care work. In Australia, it has been a white elitist, classist solution
and as such, inherently racist, generated from their unearned privilege. Both middle class and
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wealthy women work with those without power or economic value, reflecting their own shadow,
being without power in the wider, paid economy. This work was promoted by the Christian
church’s belief that women should be home-based where their natural caring instincts could
flourish in safety and in biological fulfilment of their destiny. Women would look after children,
the elderly, the disabled and the sick, appropriate for their role in life, as they could not cope in
the real world of men. It was easier and safer to establish female charities that were not truly
businesses, than take on the fight for more power to restructure world and local systems. It is a
mirror image of the predominant androcentric, patriarchal religious and political power systems
with its accompanying economic system. Women have instead, grown their own moral and
ethical power within this unvalued system. It has resonated with the strongly held belief by
women that caring, charitable works were somehow ‘superior’ to the male dominated
commercial and political worlds. This was encouraged by the Church which promoted the
Gospel teachings of caring for the poor and meek whose rewards would be in heaven and which
aligned well with the neo-liberal, capitalistic worldviews. So care work provided the
environment for the female version of power that grew out of their sense of victimization. This
was due to the political, religious and gendered discrimination with its connections between
feminized victim-power (Wolf 1993; Morris 2007) and the caring role (Noddings 2003). These
combined together so women could identify and stand in solidarity with victims of poverty,
abuse and neglect. They became the focus for white, middle-class, female charity, supported and
encouraged by the androcentric, patriarchal constructs of the Church’s teachings and practices in
Western culture and society, concerning worthiness and benevolence.
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It is interesting that the notion of ‘service’ held by Church’s teachings has acquired an inner,
transformational quality as an outer expression of a love of humanity. It is linked into the
broader sacralisation of the care work and it encourages commitment to service as an ideal, to the
actual experience and a belief in the righteousness and moral virtue accrued by those caring.
The antidote to self-interest is to commit and to find cause, to commit to something
outside of ourselves. To be a part of creating something we care about so we can
endure the sacrifice, risk, and adventure that commitment entails. This is the deeper
meaning of service’ (Block 1993:10).
As another consideration, Bell and Taylor (2004) pointed to Maslow’s contribution to the
discussion on spirituality in the workplace which has important implications for care work. They
acknowledged workplace spirituality was rarely noted, but it offered an additional layer of
meaning to the consideration of how care work is provided and why it has become embodied in
this framework. It is worth enquiring whether this spiritual aspect has been generated because of
and by the women who do the work, or whether this is a construct of an androcentric world, to
give care work its meaning within our religious and cultural expectations.
Maslow’s concept of transcendence through self-actualization is an inherently
spiritual notion … ‘Salvation’ constituted a by-product of this process that could be
attained primarily through self-actualisation. Maslow describes self-actualisation as
achievable through the ‘resacralisation of experience’. Through this the individual
is able to reconnect with the sacred, the eternal and the symbolic and give up
reliance on modern defence mechanisms which lead to a mistrust of virtue and
values (Bell and Taylor 2004:445-446).
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It is relatively simple for charities to establish their specialty of caring work within strong ethical
frameworks, imbued with a highly sensitive moral character and spiritual basis. This ensures it is
unassailable to criticism and judgment, either about the work conditions and expectations within
the modern industrial and community environment, or within feminist, classist or racist critiques.
This links directly to previously mentioned characteristics, where the motivations of care work,
the sense of volunteerism, the experience itself and relationship between the carer and the ‘careee’ are identified as critical components of care work.

4.

THE FEMALE CHARACTER OF CHARITIES

Finally, in considering the ‘The Economics of Charity’, it is proposed that one way to look at the
charity phenomenon, with its caring purposes, care experience and the relationships that emerge
and flourish within the care work, together with its economics, is through a new capacity to
define the charitable identity and organisation as ‘female’ (Morris 2007). Charitable care work is
wrapped around with a fat veneer of patriarchy and androcentricity comprehensively expressed
in Australian politics, commerce, religion, culture and community. It is possible to use this
female organisation perspective to explore existing conflicts over the economics of charity in
contrast to the realities of a feminised, care organisation. So the question is asked finally: how do
charities survive financially in a competitive marketplace, where androcentric governments and
business set the rules? One possible answer is offered: charities survive by paying low wages to
female employees (due to political and economic decisions by society, made possible through
funding contracts) and continue to use large numbers of volunteers. Charities justify and
rationalise this economic injustice by raising into our consciousness, the sacralised motivation
that impels people to volunteer, gifting their time and skills towards the broader community
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good. Individuals have a commitment to the wider concepts of the common good, common
wealth and public benefit. It is encompassed in the Christian rule of ‘loving my neighbour as
myself’. Individuals acquire grace and salvation through doing good works (Beder 2000) or seek
redemption for their voracious capitalistic appetite by metamorphosing into philanthropists
(Zizek 2008). While some of those working in charities doing care work are not Christians, the
philosophical underpinnings speak to this meta-narrative. It demonstrates a recognition of the
inherent undervaluing of care work, carers, care recipients and charities which has remained
unchanged for centuries. Charities have resisted unrelenting pressure from globalised
corporations which complain about the sector’s size and lack of level playing fields because
many large charities behave as commercial businesses which have found the charitable culture
and care work as a profitable business opportunity.

So irrespective of the different client categories, the inclusion or exclusion of particular groups,
economically, charity clients have become consumers with a hierarchical value placed on the
most lucrative, those who generate the most funding, the most ‘needy’ of all the needy. Charities
are economically pressured to seek clients who bring in money but do not require intensive
support. Equally, governments seek to drive down the price of uneconomic clients, giving rise to
opportunities for unethical practices within the community marketplace. Economic value is
placed on large client numbers and contracts, turning the wealthiest charities into de facto
corporations. Charitable corporate governance discussions are focussed on strategic planning,
financial projections, bottom-line decisions, returns on investments and tax breaks.

Large

charities employ corporate-minded CEOs and staff whose salaries soak up surpluses that used to
sustain non-profitable client services. These costs are accepted because the CEOs promise to
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update, professionalise and make the charity more accountable, as it is portrayed as needing
economic and governance makeovers. These assumptions seem unquestioned. We should be
asking whether corporatisation has made a value difference to services from client or staff
perspectives; and whether the governance makeover is designed instead to suit the new client
i.e., the government funding body or business, rather than the charity’s community client who
should be at the centre of the decision-making processes.
It is argued the gap between corporate and charity sectors has, in some instances, become so
narrow it is hard to see any differences. The tension for the post-modern charity in this narrative
lies unequivocally in the packaging and branding of the client consumer, who is now ‘the other’
(Klein 2001). The ‘other’ is scapegoated and dehumanized, language adjustments have enabled
the ‘other’ to be objectified and does not require charities to challenge their own beliefs. Survival
strategies for charitable businesses include outsourcing services, mirroring the corporate sector’s
separation of service from money and people and raising the ‘fear’ stakes (Gardner 2008). The
mid 1990’s government policy shift moved charities into the funding purchaser/provider model
with contracts and has reduced the transformational capacity of female ethical organizational
caring. Instead it has become evidence of our capacity to transfer our own shadow back onto the
‘other’, through our charitable model of economic care, so the focus of our care has now become
the funding body.
Politically, large NGOs work hard to become power brokers (DeMars 2005) as this is seen as
essential for organizational survival. With political power comes money and both commodities
are sought. Advocacy is short-term, focused on the ‘here and now’, primarily to ensure one’s
own survival. The ‘other’ is out of sight, of less value in the needs hierarchy and less my
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personal responsibility. Agencies have to act carefully in case they jeopardise funding. More
time is spent in risk management in the name of sound governance principles, ensuring tight
management control. Compromised leaders struggle for principles that might bring positive
major economic consequences for their charity and there does not seem to be a third way (Morris
2007). Women’s voices in these deliberations as archetypes of the charitable care work and
recipients are muted and lost.
SUMMARY
This suggested answer to the question ‘The Economics of Charity – Who Cares?’ is one of many
possible narratives. The discrepancies outlined here in the values and ethics in charities and care
work provided by women contribute to the continued problematisation of charities as sites of
gender disadvantage. Leadership decisions are made based on the priority of organisational
financial survival and government contracts; while the gendered discrimination by charities of
their employees and clients with its religious endorsements cannot continue to be ignored. This
narrative suggests the economics of charity have hollowed out the care; it exists, but the
experiences are transitory and discriminatory, the ethics of care is illusory. The charities veneer
is wearing thin and female voices describing a female, value-based ethical caring are falling
silent, buried under the discriminatory experiences, displaying a lack of congruence between the
larger narrative of sacralisation of care versus economic survival. The dominant story is of a
corporatised, economically driven sector, where leaders are promoted on their ability to run
businesses that happen to be charities.
The drive for organisational survival and the need to provide employment conditions to match
business and government speak to the drive for equality under the feminist and economic justice
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imperatives. I now ask ‘what will be the charity’s future once its profile of delivering care work
is explored from this gendered perspective of injustice?’ Although we are busy fighting for
female economic justice and equity for charities, there is most critically, insufficient debate
about the lack of transformational leadership to define the charitable sector’s differences without
continuing to entrench gender discrimination based on employment practices, the care work
itself, the values and spirituality as determined by the women who carry out the care work and
who are its service recipients, currently and in the future.
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